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Abstract. The goal of our contribution is to provide a programmatic foundations of a 
binding political paradigm. The outline has two main parts, where the first one gives 
philosophical principles justifying a few most fundamental ("metaphysical") positions 
(1. Only that which is organized as a system can be sustainable. 2. The sustention of the 
entirety of being is a value in itself. 3. The system can be sustained because the totality of 
being is always orientated to a pre-given model, whose sustention does not depend on the 
current condition of everything that enters (or should enter) the whole of the system. 3a: 
The inherently assembled whole is different from the totality of a random variety as much 
as its “ingredients” are pervaded by the internal substantive form emerging from the 
principle of the whole.), while the second part lays out practical, both individually ethical 
and generally political implications of the postulates given above. The text also has three 
appendices in which, in accordance with the programmatic part of the contribution, we 
attempt to anticipate and initiate a dialogue with possible objections and dilemmas over 
our principal theses or their consequences. In an effort to avoid an ideological type of 
language, the contribution fundamentally and systematically abstains from classifications, 
alternatives, and affiliations intrinsic to traditional ideologies. 
Key words:  National programme, political theory, common cause, crisis, totality, 
metaphysics. 
INTRODUCTION 
The aim of this text is not to present and interpret certain positions in political phi-
losophy and/or ideological stances from a well-known spectrum of society and state doc-
trines. We shall attempt here to offer an independent philosophical foundation of a gener-
ally binding political paradigm, without delving into particular political and ideological 
details. For this reason, we shall strive to move the arguments and presentation away from 
the domain of ideological discourse – for this should precisely give a contribution to the 
development of a proper political language, which should, again, be "ideological" to the 
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least extent possible – not only in the sense of overcoming traditional ideological schools 
and alternatives (which is obvious already from the title of this contribution) – but even 
more in the sense of avoiding the serious epistemological and axiological limitations of 
such type of language in general. Therefore, this outline should be both ideologically and 
politically relevant, but in such a way as not to belong to the ideological type of 
language.1 Hence, in a sense, in this draft one will be able to recognize both "left" and 
"right", "radical" and "conservative", "communitarian", and even "liberalist" undertones, 
while, in another sense, the text that follows should either fully transcend, or partly even 
in principle precede those kinds of ideological discourse – in such a way as to serve as a 
remedy to moderate their almost "inherent" single-sidedness and incompleteness. 
Although the topic here belongs to practical philosophy, it seems that an outline like 
this one can be more generally founded if the problem is viewed from the most general, 
fundamental theoretical position, so that subsequently, through their "application", i.e. 
"translation" to the domain of practical philosophy, one could get to more elaborated po-
sitions, immediately relevant to the domain in question. Since it presupposes the applica-
bility of the most general fundamental insights to the practical realm, this outline could be 
considered as "Platonic" – in, conditional and partial, contrast to the Aristotelian distinc-
tion between the fundamental-ontological and practical-ethical problems, i.e. questioning 
of the theoretical norm on harmony between the individual and the community. The posi-
tion given below on the community as an organic harmony between parts and the whole 
will also be Platonic. However, we shall not go so far as to claim that there are far-reach-
ing comprehensive structural analogies between the topics of theoretical and practical 
philosophy. Instead of providing our position on such a view of the structures of theory 
and reality, which would impose serious obligations, we may just state that such a 
"strong" assumption will not be necessary for our purpose. 
The outline itself will be presented as a series of fundamental theses that to which will 
be ascribed quasi-axiomatic validity. However, contrary to geometrical axiomatic sys-
tems, this set of postulates does not need to be even by far formally and methodologically 
impeccable – in this theoretical domain such a goal is unattainable, and one should thus 
not strive for it. First of all, if they are viewed as axioms, these postulates probably nei-
ther belong to the minimal set, nor are entirely interdependent.2 They are not positioned 
on equally general levels: rather, some of them can be read not as independent assump-
tions, but only as positions strongly linked to some other fundamental positions. In that 
sense, the increasing precision and specification in defining the later postulates – in the 
                                                           
1 True, in one part of philosophy there have long been attempts to insinuate not only that philosophy sometimes 
represents concealed ideology (for instance, Marx's The German Ideology), but, much more radically, that 
philosophical language in itself has such power structures pledged at its core that there is no substantial differ-
ence between philosophical and ideological language, since, allegedly, both cases represent a variation of a 
unique strategic discourse, rational in terms of its aims, but not rational in terms of its pure arguments. More-
over, some consider that philosophy, in its self-concealing ideologicity, is a particularly subversive form of the 
ideological interpretation of the world. If the former strategy could be considered plausible to an extent, the 
latter represents not only a form of auto-destruction of philosophical thought, but also much more: the syn-
drome of its accelerated decline in the present culture and age – and thus we shall not consider it here as 
something that we should commit ourselves to. 
2 These two prerequisites are common in geometric axiomatization, where the task of axiomatizing a domain is 
most clearly demonstrated. In that sense, geometry can work as a role model for analogous philosophical efforts. 
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exposition of the conception – will result in the transition from the domain of philoso-
phizing on principles (in the sense of a ‘heno(mero)logy'3, as we might call it on this occa-
sion) to the domain of what is relevant to the philosophy of society/community, i.e. poli-
tics. However, these fundamental postulates, though interdependent, cannot be viewed as 
a firmly interlinked chain of inference. 
Finally, the "axiomatics -similitude" of what follows is conditional in that, in spite of 
the corresponding practice in geometry, we shall attempt to suggest that each of the pos-
tulates has plausibility of its own. We shall therefore try, if not to prove them (as theo-
rems), then at least to "reasonably" support them and thus, we hope, make them credible. 
I  FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS 
a) POSTULATE 1: Only that which is organized as a system can be sustainable. 
This may seem as an abstract and vacuous, fully "metaphysical" position. However, 
whatever we we may mean by this, be it an individual, be it systems constructed of a 
number of independent units, or be it the whole, all of these in some way imply a regular-
ity which, naturally, cannot generally exclude the possibility of change. However, when 
the power of the permanent (the form) is not strong enough to constrain the unconstrained 
and unpredictable overflow of change, or: in circumstances in which the change from one 
state does not lead to another sustainable "state" (and a "state" is, one should add, a con-
struction of proportionate stability in the midst of perpetual change) – the result is chaos 
and decay. When the system and organization become so weak that not a single condition 
possible at the moment can become rooted any longer, this most likely means that the 
process of decay has started, so that after the current inconsistence of forms there should 
follow a completely formless collapse, i.e. "creation" of nothingness itself. The "nothing-
ness", of course does not have to imply any literal material destruction, fragmentation to 
the level of dust, physical "annihilation", but merely the destruction of the kind of being 
that the form of existence had had before, that had been typical and "inborn" for this be-
ing. That would mean that different types of beings can have different kinds of annihila-
tion, i.e. that the transition to a certain form of non-existence for one kind of being would 
not would not necessarily lead another one to total annihilation. 
b) POSTULATE 2: Sustention of the entirety of being, which is capable of building 
order, is a value sui generis. 
After the all-out alienation from and often vehement and even ruthless criticism of 
metaphysics, the effort to rehabilitate the Whole – not merely in the epistemological 
sense, but also in the ontological, even value-relevant sense – may seem unbearably ob-
solete. However, the impression is that the anti-metaphysical, i.e. the anti-whole reaction 
in philosophy, which – after all the blows it suffered from Kant and the Enlightenment – 
gained its decisive, devastating support in the Modern Age with Kierkegaard, while in its 
modern, virtually paroxysmal versions it would get as far as to say that "the whole is un-
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true" (Adorno), is but an inopportune attempt to rehabilitate, in the midst of the totalizing 
reign of Ratio, the (actually or allegedly jeopardized) individuality, authenticity, and "un-
repeatability". The subjection of particulars to the whole, where the former ones must also 
know how to subject their own purposes, needs, and peculiarities to this whole, cannot be 
sustainable from the viewpoint of a predominantly humanistic theoretical thought, or from 
any most broadly constructed fundamental theoretical position, either. After becoming 
familiar with the currents of the Western philosophical thought in the last one hundred 
and sixty years, one must be surprised, however, to learn that the anti-wholeness-reaction 
in philosophy has, most likely permanently and irreparably, assumed the negative attitude 
and sentiment, thanks to which one most often fails to have an inevitable insight that 
anything individual can become sustainable, functional, grounded, authentic, and recog-
nized only under the auspices of a proportionately stable system. The whole, therefore, 
must not be reduced to always random "aggregates" (sums) of individual parts and con-
structions of the specific, but, as a principle, it transcendentally precedes the possible 
emergence and existence of everything "sub-holistic" (in terms of substance, form, and 
genesis), thus further determining the conditions responsible for the content of its being. 
Otherwise, the very possibility that the whole (being) should persevere would depend on 
contingent circumstances of everlasting adaptation or non-adaptation of singularities, 
conceived as existing in a self-sufficient and thus self-defining way. If, therefore, one can 
recognize the message of the previous two centuries of humanistic philosophy as the re-
quest to recognize the value of the specific and the individual, then one must – precisely 
for this individual – a fortiori contend that the whole is a value, of not only its own, but of 
the highest kind. This, finally, holds not only since the whole sets up conditions for the 
possibility of the existence of various individualities, but because everything particular, in 
order to exist at all, while it exists, must inhere a sufficient quantity of permanence and 
order – as required by its "nature" and its mode of existence. 
c) POSTULATE 3: The system can be sustained because the totality of being is 
always orientated toward a pre-given model, whose sustention does not 
depend on the current condition of everything that enters (or should enter) 
the whole of the system. 
It might seem that this call for the acknowledgment of the meaning of the whole as a 
being in itself is still a benevolent and too big step towards the metaphysical tradition. 
The response to this would first be that the question of the nature of this potential role 
model, especially the question of its ontological, i.e. transontological sense (as laid out in 
Plato's ontology) should be put aside. Still, if it has been pointed out above that the whole, 
or the principle of entirety, has a constitution which transcends anything individual sub-
ject to it, and which does not receive its meaning subsequently, from a current, accidental 
integration of the meanings of individualities, where, naturally, some relative change-
ability is inevitably allowed, then this whole must be shaped as essential unchangeability, 
which must be able to effectively and incessantly exert proper influence on anything that 
is individual. Autonomy, aprioricaty, unchangeability, and efficiency are exactly the at-
tributes of what one can label a model. As the problem discussed here belongs to funda-
mental-ontological core, then the principle of the whole (however we understand it and as 
much as we can appropriately understand it at all) establishes itself as the primordial 
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source of the entire beingness (realitiness) and all modelness. Therefore, following the 
role model, or measuring the level of appropriateness to it – a consequence of the 
following – also represents a value for all that is directed to the role model – whether 
anything particular, or the (real) whole of it. 
d) POSTULATE 3a: The inherently assembled whole is different from the 
totality of a random variety as much as its "ingredients" are pervaded by 
the internal substantive form emerging from the principle of the whole. 
For the existence of an inherently jagged variety to possess a certain necessity (which 
should, however, be clearly differentiated from the scholastic "being by necessity"), it 
must have a certain internal interrelatedness which will vouch for its (future) or explain its 
(present) consistency. Having in mind the reigning tendency of contemporary philosophi-
cal education, one could note two possible strategies for refuting this position, and also 
such judgment. First, the fact that this world (in the real and ontic sense) has existed for 
so long (regardless of whether we can discover for how long exactly, and since when ex-
actly in this particular way) does not have to mean that the fact of its existence has had to 
go hand in hand with a transcendental necessity immanent to the being. Not only this 
world (in terms of experience) but, in general, any kind of its organization would thus 
need to be conceived of as radically contingent. However, the assumption of a long-lived 
yet in "essence" accidental world, i.e. being in general, is intuitively implausible, and its 
acceptance would result in the banishment of one of the decisive questions man is facing 
from the most comprehensive, competent, and general discipline of his thought. And is 
this not, in Kant's words, quite "scandalous"?4 
The second strategy in this sense would be to question the meaning of the very use of 
the word, not to mention the concept of the "whole" – in a scientific context, as, allegedly, 
it would be a mere illusion brought about by our natural language, where, however, such a 
concept could not withhold any serious theoretical verification. Namely, the "whole" 
could be interpreted as the word that we need in order to better find our way in everyday 
life, which, however, becomes very "dangerous" if one gets to believe that in reality there 
is actually something (real) corresponding to it. Such a position is a legitimate heir to ex-
treme nominalism which shows ulterior distrust of the possibility that there is any relevant 
way for Being and thought to be interwoven in an intelligible manner. First of all, such a 
position is ultimately very vulnerable. As it may be, man's very language and thought can 
be viewed as "worldly" phenomena, as "parts" of this world so to speak, i.e. as "beings". 
If the most potent metaphysical minds, those trusting that even the constrained human 
reason can notice the intelligibility and transparency of the connection between thought 
and Being, may consider them to have no essentiality, then there are no obstacles to 
translating such a view to all reality. In that case, any attempt of thinking, even radically 
skeptical and nominalistic, would be devoid of any meaning grounded in reality.5 
                                                           
4 Thus one can claim that, historically viewed, the fragmentization of philosophy started within itself, when, in 
its desire to respect the ideal of scientificality, it gradually began to renounce its more traditional topics. 
5 A more elaborated form of this argument is provided by Jens Halfwassen: "Therefore, this objection chal-
lenges the view that structures of our thought can fundamentally match the structures of Being – and, exactly 
through this, it shows itself to be meaningless. Namely, one who believes that reality can also consist of a dis-
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In addition, it would not be too difficult to provide an entire range of significant ex-
amples – from everyday experience to natural sciences or humanities – where one could 
prove the efficiency of conceptual dichotomies, such as not only part–whole, many– one, 
but also others, such as essence–being, etc. Naturally, each and every criticism of meta-
physics and its language cannot be fully ungrounded. To say the least, conceptual think-
ing, instead of trying to fathom elementary nodes and structural elements of intelligibility 
in reality (i.e. provide such thinking that would "follow" the Being), has in time come to 
the situation in which it elaborates on almost endless conceptual distinctions, trusting that 
they are not only cognitively and technically, but also actually relevant and real. Histori-
cally, however, after this reaction to such an attempted organization of reality followed – 
in the structures of human thought that made a turn in proclaiming that conceptual dis-
tinctions were relevant primarily to thinking, but not to reality and Being, if they should 
be granted independent meaning at all. 
However, there is impression, that this was an undue deviation from the desirable po-
sition of theoretical thought, which also renounced not only that which endangers a par-
ticular tradition in European thinking but also that which enables philosophical and theo-
retical thinking at all. The issue in question here is an unreasonably strong reaction with 
long-term effect – caused both by the imperfection of metaphysical thinking in philosophy 
(from the meticulous scientific standpoint) and by the obvious and serious difficulties of 
its language (and no language one wishes to think in can provide answers without facing 
major difficulties). 
The final fundamental postulate essentially claims that, if it were not pervaded by the 
subject ("substrate") of singularity (which the former lacks)6, the whole would break 
down into the mutually indifferent or accidentally correlated many, wherein there would 
always be a danger of its sudden (accidental) transition into nothingness (more precisely: 
"the nothingness of the whole" – in the sense of the clarification provided above on 
meaning in the varieties of nothingness), precisely because its getting things together 
would be accidental, and not necessary. 
Naturally, one should stress that the presentation of the wholeness of being as per-
vaded by an internal, substantive form is the other side of the conception of the wholeness 
of being as reflecting an external model. In essence, adaptedness to an external model as-
sumes its expression from the permeation with a particular internal form, which means 
that this postulate is neither theoretically nor axiomatically autonomous (and is thus la-
beled 3a instead of 4). 
                                                                                                                                                
united multitude of unrelated particulars simultaneously ascribes the very real relevance to provisions of 
thought such as ‘reality', ‘multitude', and ‘individuality', thus assuming the very thing one wishes to refute – the 
unity of being and thought. Additionally, the very conceptions such as ‘multitude' or ‘individuality' can be con-
ceived of only as individual provisions, so that a pluralist, already in the formulation of his pluralism – always 
presupposes the advantage of singularity, which may be done only through the provisions of thought. Reaching 
for the unity of our thought is, therefore, not only subjective, and unattainable for us. Rather, objective truth is 
undeniably its constituent part – because the truth itself is assumed already in the course of its attempted refu-
tation." (Jens Halfwassen, "Platons Metaphysik des Einen", in: Philotheos. International Journal for Philoso-
phy and Theology 4 (2004), Niksic-Trebinje-Belgrade, pp. 207–222, here: pp. 212–213). 
6 In Plato's Parmenides 157 d it is claimed that everything( παν) becomes a whole (ολον) only if pervaded by 
the principle of unity. 
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Interconclusion and Transition to the Second Section 
Decisive for political philosophy from this derivation is the insight that this funda-
mental position is also applicable to "human affairs", more precisely, to human commu-
nity. Therefore, a political community devoid of the subject (substance) of consolida-
tion/inclusion, devoid of the principle of the whole, etc. – could no longer exist as such, it 
would dissolve, and, in practice, become ontically destroyed. Therefore, the substrate of 
the whole (state/nation), which at least includes the tradition of the nation and the state, 
must be present in its parts (citizens), both in the objective sense (in the way in which 
such tangible given actually forms them) and in the subjective sense (meaning corre-
sponding explicit self-identification, irrespective of how much it is actually appropriate). 
A nation becomes that which it is, and a nation in general, when it consolidates and in-
cludes the totality of its members with a unique idea/form, through which process it as-
sumes both identity and integrity. The gathering of the many into a whole is possible since 
the subject of the whole, the derivative of, so to speak, "the national universal"7 becomes 
present in (almost) all individual members, where, to an extent, and in a certain form, this 
is explicitly perceived by the members within themselves. Henceforth a third element is 
obtained for the individuality of the people/nation – the self-perception of its own dignity, 
otherwise known by the name (and feeling) of patriotism. 
II  ETHICAL AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 
The starting point for this outline is the premise that the whole should have advantage 
over a part – if their "interests" should collide, i.e. if the part – in a broader sense – is not 
in the function of the whole. How should one understand this whole, however? Some 
radical ideologies, whether "left" or "right", in their own way also assume that the major-
ity and the many have advantage over the particular and the minority, believing, therefore, 
that the interest of the group in itself has much greater importance than individual rights 
and interests. However, in articulating, and particularly in applying their programmes, 
                                                           
7 Such a term/concept may seem an oxymoron, since the substance of the national is both changeable in time 
and particular. However, one should state the following here – certainly with no intention of claiming that the 
arguments that follow will fully refute such reasonable objections (and perhaps some others). Even though the 
nation is a historical category and even though real nations can change their "substance", i.e. the nodes of self-
identification (or their "being") through time – the assumption for the preservation of the nation as such is a 
certain (more precisely: strong and encompassing enough) continuity on the fundamental plain (even if some 
would call this a construction of identity – though this factor must work at least in the property of that which is 
‘as-if' essential. [On this see our contribution: „Am Rande des Europäischen: die Dilemmen über einen 
gängigen Europa-Entwurf" ["On the Verge of the European: Dilemmas of a Current Project of Europe"], in: 
Polylog. Zeitschrift für interkulturelles Philosophieren,"Das zweite Europa" [The Second Europe], Vienna 
2004, pp. 37–53). If this is not the case, then this community – even if it bears the name and impression of a 
nation – at its very core heads for an accidental existence, prone to nullification, which makes it much more 
vulnerable than those nations which are more grounded in this respect, and thus more resistant to constant 
challenges and possible attacks on their national existence,  
Second, the particularity of the national is not an obstacle to its universality at all since the particularity is laid 
out towards the outside, towards other nations, while the universality is laid out "towards the inside", against 
individuals, groups, and subentities belonging to this national – just like Plato's ideas are, for instance, 
universal in relation to their underlying things, but particular in relation to the idea/principle of the Good. 
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they have often not realized that the advantage of the whole over a part should not be un-
derstood in an external, mechanical sense as the primacy of a bare factually given over the 
particular. Rather, the point is that the particular should be subject to the whole based on 
a principle which has an ontological and ethical sense, which can be used to lay founda-
tions and legitimacy for the whole. The sense of this distinction is avoid that this whole 
could be distorted and turned into a force exerting unjustified violence over the particular. 
However, given the assumption of the true foundation of the whole in that which is ap-
propriate, the service to the common cause would not only represent a first-degree ethical 
commandment, but would also affect every individual member of the community (irre-
spective of how he should actually act in his daily existential and ethical practice). Hence 
the type of the relationship to the whole provides feedback which determines the quality 
of the ontological and ethical shaping of individual(s). One should, thus, decisively stress 
that the meaning of the whole is not just in itself, that it does not exist for its own sake, 
but that its true meaning, and also ideal projection is – reciprocal fertilization of itself and 
its parts, i.e. self-giving of the parts to the whole, and service of the whole to its parts. The 
need for some parts to possibly sacrifice themselves to the whole at a given point exists 
only if this desirable harmony between particulars and the whole has not been reached 
yet, but solely if this really projected and at least partly achieved whole actually corre-
sponds to the demands for the whole described above. 
Therefore, the issue here must not be any slavish subjugation and devaluation of indi-
vidualities, or the individual as such; rather, all individuals, being in the service of the 
whole, would receive certain stability, value, and truly veracious and permanent recogni-
tion as individualities. One should conceive of this analogously to the ancient philosophi-
cal formula, well-known even before it was pronounced in Latin – conicidentia opposito-
rum. For this reason, in practical matters, it is unacceptable to work to one's own (alleged 
or actual) individual advantage by harming the whole, and thus self-excluding oneself 
from the whole, by making an artificial opposition between the transient and perishable 
self as opposed to the whole, which, if kept in line with the model, should be durable and, 
in the hope of every nation – intransient.8 Thus he who harms the whole for his apparent 
own benefit, among other things – although unconsciously – harms himself. Our point of 
departure, in turn, is that every individual is more valuable as a part of the long-lasting 
and encompassing community than when taken as a transient particular. Therefore, indi-
vidualistic understanding of personal good cannot be normatively and theoretically justi-
fied, and its lack of foundations and unhealthy partiality actually qualify it as something 
perishable, apparent, and, ultimately, harmful and dangerous. Through the possible con-
frontation of our existence as individuals with ourselves as parts of a "sacred" whole, the 
better (higher) part of the self (ethical and reasonable) becomes contrasted with the worse 
(lower) part (lustful and hedonistic). The individual, as a member of the community based 
on genus and ethnicity, is in a sense intransient – conditionally speaking, the community 
may provide for its unlimited prolongation in time thus reproducing ontic, ethical and 
cultural universals, while the individual in himself can last only as long as his lifetime. 
Thus the supremacy of the individual good as something "counter-general" to true gener-
ality means to choose the transient and not the (relatively and potentially) intransient. 
                                                           
8 In that sense Plato says: "You become angry because you do not realize that all which is best for you is good 
for both the whole and for you, and this is so because the two of you have a common origin." (Nomoi 903 d–e). 
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That this is not just intellectual imagination can be seen in the careful analysis of the 
behavior of citizens of big, successful states. They often (tacitly or consciously, and 
thereby usually decisively) express loyalty to their state, from which, on the other hand, 
they gain some (patriotic) self-awareness, and their characteristic (often distinctive) pride 
in contacts with member of other nations. Patriotism can, therefore, be viewed as a sub-
jective expression having emerged from a bidirectional process in which the individual 
invests himself in the whole with his actions, thoughts, and feelings in order to gain foun-
dation from it in return in those areas in which as an individual he would never (or rarely, 
hardly, and extraordinarily) be able to get, which do not pertain to his individually "unre-
peatable" personal traits. Patriotism, thus, ideally implies the (not necessarily constant 
and fully balanced) fitting of parts and whole, the harmony of "roles" and "contribu-
tions", and finally of the (social) Being (i.e. practice) and social (self)awareness. 
One should not, however, lose track of the fact that the concept of patriotism should 
not be reduced only to the rationally justifiable loyalty to the community since it also en-
compasses the emotional bond to the particular community and its historically-shaped 
given. Even more, the nature of this bond is such that it usually does not allow that citizen 
– excluding additional theoretical training or corresponding intellectual curiosity – should 
reach the fundamental insight into the obligation that he should be loyal to his community 
as a community, but his loyalty is primarily his loyalty being primarily mediated by vari-
ous forms of concrete, as a rule proportionately unreflected given, and by the intimate 
strongholds of national identification capable of producing the sense of national obliga-
tion. Since that which is given through history and tradition being typical cannot be ra-
tionally well-founded, it is understandable that the attitude to it is mediated primarily 
through emotions, and, to a lesser extent, and with the few – also through reason. 
However, if the intent of this contribution is to provide as rational view of the essen-
tial foundation of the political community as possible, and also the analysis of relations 
within it and against it, it might seem that the introduction of emotions, and respect of the 
given, as (hypothetical) foundations for the primary constitution of a political community 
is – inconsistent, and that, if nothing else, it undermines the plan and intention of the ex-
position announced at the beginning of this text. Nevertheless, a political community, as a 
practice for organizing a group of people on a rational basis, and not just on the grounds 
of natural necessity and the traditionally given, must have a pre-given, potential "subject-
matter" for the application of the rational principles it is supposed to be based upon. A 
political community cannot be construed on the grounds of the already existing traditional 
natural community which is internally consolidated through the joint identification of its 
members and things which are given and are experienced as specific for the pre-political 
organization of this community. Therefore, the rational principles on which a political 
community is based cannot fully ground this community, but only pre-ground it – count-
ing in this process on the already present points of support and acting within the limits 
that have already been delineated in the pre-political (even pre-historical) facts of the 
emotional framework of its existence. This additional foundation may change the nature 
of factual relations within the community, but it can in no way either rationally ground the 
given that provides a basis for rational identification with this community or replace it 
with some more encompassing or comprehensive rational arrangements. Therefore, a po-
litical community is not solely rational for, as potentially such, it would need to be able to 
reasonably establish itself (through the "voice" of some thinkers), and accordingly estab-
Č. D. KOPRIVICA 20 
lish its beginning (αρχή) and its essence (ουσία). Since this obviously is not and cannot be 
possible, every political community, including the one with the longest political tradition 
– a tradition of relatively public-open, transparent, and rationally grounded organization, 
will experience the need to include certain forms of speech (no matter how scientific) in 
public awareness on the beginning and (quasi)essence of the nation, which will, however, 
necessarily remain outside the boundaries of rationality – the former in the guise of the 
national myth, and the latter in the form of predominant, self-interpreting opinions. Politi-
cal reconstitution of a community, therefore, represents a form of upgrade of the natural 
organization of the already existing (proto)community.9 
It is thus shown that in the language of the organization of a community the given and 
the justified, the a-rational and the rational, the specific and the (relatively) general inevi-
tably intertwine. This becomes pronounced anew when one tries to inspect the morally 
relevant components in the formation of a political community. Namely, one could say in 
advance that the political community is a moral organism, to use the ancient phrase. Pri-
marily, this means that from the obligation of the individual to the whole derive mutual 
obligations to all its members. In other words, the reciprocity of the mutual solidary and 
moral communication between members of the community is at least partly mediated by 
their attitude to the whole. Therefore, the ethical solidarity principle is a result of the 
analogous application of the onto-henological formula of the unity of the many onto the 
political community. 
In the ethnic community which has still not developed itself to the level of political 
organization the general commitment to help all members also goes without saying, but its 
nature is quite different and limitations are considerable. Namely, solidarity with compa-
triots there emerges only from the awareness of belonging to the same people/ethnicity 
(and this awareness sometimes exists even when there is no actual blood relation), while 
there is no trace of the consciousness of the mutual obligation to help members of the 
community as parts of the whole which encompasses and defines them. Second, regard-
less of the fact the foundation for the construction of a political community is always eth-
nic and nation-bearing, during the historical construction of peoples, and nations in par-
ticular, members of other ethnicities have become constituent parts, so that, in some cases, 
limiting the solidarity community to blood relations (or alleged blood relations) would 
banish some members of the (potentially) political community, even if their attitude to the 
common cause were impeccable. Finally, if the solidarity is grounded in the principle of 
blood, rather than constitution through self-perception, solidarity with compatriots would 
be the last of the types of solidarity, starting from the family, over clan, tribe and region, 
and would only then, perhaps, reach the people or nation stage.10 In this process, the 
smaller the number of persons involved in these solidarity circles, the stronger the bond 
and obligation. While solidarity with compatriots and fellow citizens (of mainly the same 
ethnicity) has the same range of validity – but a different character, on the lower levels of 
solidarity communities this bonding can collide with the principle of commitment to the 
political community as a moral body, and particularly with morality if it, more broadly, 
applies not only to the community but to humanity as a whole. 
                                                           
9 See more on this in our above cited text "On the Verge of the European". 
10 In other words, a people may emerge when the scope of the solidary community overpowers blood and 
family bonds.  
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It has turned out, therefore, that in the domain of practical politics, the natural versus 
self-interpreting bonding alternative is neither decisive nor comprehensive, since in reality 
both these principles mediate the concrete life of political communities as moral organ-
isms entailing general obligation – as applied to a factually given, and specifically shaped 
segment of humanity. The question is posed whether it is possible that something which 
by its nature applies generally (humanity) should be applied restrictively (people), and, if 
the answer were "yes", how would then this "limited universality" coexist with the man-
datory, general human morality? The answer to the first question is easy when we recall, 
for instance, the slaveholding democracy of the Greek polis, in which generally applicable 
and reasonably grounded principles applied for citizens, but not for slaves through the 
very fact of their social, and sometimes ethnic or racial descent. Secondly, the actual 
blending of the moral and natural community (resulting in the emergence of a political 
community) does not at all mean that, viewed in the sense of its factual "embodiment" – 
the abstract, universal morality would have to be suspended. In this process, universally 
human moral obligations toward all members of humanity do not cease to be valid. 
Rather, in addition to the general obligation to man as such, a lower circle of obligations 
is made, to those standing in between the closest relatives and beloved persons on the one 
hand, and man in general, on the other. Moral obligations existing to members of the peo-
ple-bearing community are exclusive – since they cannot apply (unless self-chosen) to 
members of other nations, but not in such a way as to suspend the moral obligations re-
lated to general humanity.  
The crucial question that emerges here is whether loyalty to a political community 
may collide with moral imperatives as such. This question can be viewed on different lev-
els, which in effect means that no elegant or simply coherent answer is possible. First of 
all, it is clear that in practice, commonly, real or proclaimed state interests force individu-
als to choose between morality and the (often formalized) duty to the state. Formulas of 
the unity of the many, the whole above the parts, and of integrity, identity, and dignity of 
parts based on the "substance" of the whole represent merely the formal traits (and also 
commandments) of the way in which a community is organized which, as we have seen, 
must be completed with the "substantive" factors of origin, memory, and tradition. The 
last factor limits the room for the possible application of the formal postulates given 
above, but, as such, at least the way things seem at present, its meaning should be morally 
indifferent.11 If so, the political organization of a community conformed to the formal 
postulates provided above should result in the moral acceptability of this community's be-
havior, so that in their mutual communication (i.e. international relations) political com-
munities should, in principle, act in a moral way. The fact this is often not so in reality 
should probably be ascribed to the circumstances in which actual political communities 
are not optimally morally governed from within, so that they are not constituted as moral 
                                                           
11 Of course, in principle one cannot exclude the possibility that there are such nations in whose memory and 
self-identification morally unacceptable moments persist, but this is unlikely because in collective memory own 
identity and dignity must be affirmed – which is hardly conceivable if there are parts in this memory at odds 
with moral intuition – naturally, on condition this intuition is working at all in the concrete situation. However, 
not even this can exclude that there might be nations which have the self-awareness of their own dignified 
historical character, and yet, in spite of this, time and again, as if after a "recipe", they make decisions of whose 
moral controversy individual members of this nation are, as a rule, unaware.  
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subjects, either toward the inside (in the relationship between the state, standing for the 
authority of the whole, and its parts), or, particularly, toward the outside. 
Is it possible – to ask another Kantian question – that optimally organized states 
should not pay attention to moral commandments in external relations? Yes and no. If 
states are well-organized, this is so because they hold on to rational and this means, at 
least partly also moral principles. Moral principles, however, have universal validity, i.e. 
apply also to other people and their states, which is why a well-organized state should not 
be capable of acting immorally. If the state, even though perhaps morally well-organized, 
still does so, this means that it makes conscious exceptions to the rules that cannot tolerate 
exceptions, for reasons which cannot be justified in terms of rational principles (selfish-
ness, distrust, negative prejudices of others and their attributes), and which urge it to act 
immorally. And that is obviously what describes the reality of international relations. 
Although few states can boast that they are (at least) relatively just toward the inside, 
and probably no state can boast that it acts justly in foreign relations, one can still essen-
tially explain their problematic behavior toward other partakers in international relations 
with the formula: injustice toward the inside leads to injustice toward the outside. "Injus-
tice", here, does not have to entail actual committing injustice to citizens of a state. How-
ever, if the two are principally interconnected by pre-political and a-rational grounds (for 
instance, membership in a tribe through blood relations), this means that such a commu-
nity has not been politically constituted, that the (rational) concept of justice is not yet 
rooted in it, which creates preconditions that harming non-members of this community is 
not, or should not be taken, as morally unacceptable and unjust.12 
The stage of "embodied morality" incarnated in European (as a rule nation-) states 
cannot be overcome since, due to the lack of grounds of the forces of common descent 
and memory, which are irremovable from the foundation of the national state, as the pri-
mary legal subject of international relations, cannot be overcome. Humanity, on the other 
hand, is not a concrete community: instead of the all-out "Cosmopoliteia", in actuality 
there are only individual nation-states, most of which, at least European ones, are based 
on a particular ethnic foundation. This is why a common human interest cannot be ration-
ally recognized, so that the nation shall remain the primary referent of emotional attach-
ment, which must provide, if not reflexive and rational, then certainly emotional sway to 
national identification over universally human identification, which, inevitably, deter-
mines the corresponding perception of reality and judgment of it. 
Appendix: Possible Objections to the Outline and Responses to Them 
From the idea of the community in general presented this way, one may derive appro-
priate practical guidelines for individuals, that we shall call citizen's moral and political 
imperatives: 
a) As an individual, everyone is obliged to perceive and support his interests in such 
a way as not to harm the interest of the whole, which, in individual matters, im-
plies that the whole should further persist and advance in relevant domains. 
                                                           
12 Hitler's Third Reich, for instance, would be unjust from within even if all Germans were unanimous, and if 
not a single German within it was repressed, because the grounds for the bond between the citizens were only 
natural and biological, and not rational and moral. 
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b) Everyone is obliged to carry out his life projects in such a way as to contribute to 
the benefit of the whole at least in some way – and, certainly, in such a way as not 
to harm the whole. The whole should represent a model organic order which will 
be hierarchically distinguished and interlinked from within. A criterion for internal 
hierarchical distinction among individuals should be the question of the degree of 
individual contributions to the sustention and affirmation of the community. This 
encompasses both theoretical and practical components, i.e. the question how 
much an individual, by his own behavior, represents/embodies the essence of the 
given political community, but also how much, through his theoretical and practi-
cal involvement, he actually contributes to the common cause of the community in 
general – irrespective if its individual specificity. 
In response to this, from an individualist position one may say: "I am primarily an in-
dividual, and I am not interested at all in affiliation with particular entities (ethnicity, na-
tion, religion, civilization)." A more moderate variant of this objection would be that, for 
individuals personally, some of these affiliations may be important for self-determination, 
but that is purely a private, contiguous matter. Hereby, on our part, we could respond 
from both empirical-phenomenological and fundamental-normative strategies. 
First the "phenomenological" answer. Cultural, national, religious descent can 
hardly be deleted, not because these respective entities come to us in an objective and 
biological way, through „genes", but because in all domains of "the world of human af-
fairs" – in all things that decisively depend on man's thinking and activity – durability, 
upgrade, creative remodeling from one generation to another, common descent and tradi-
tion in general – for the very nature of intercultural socialization – are inevitable and con-
stitutive. In human final and transient world reality always bears the reflection of his ori-
gin. Furthermore, man, mostly non-verbally, "remembers" all his opinions, so that man, 
already by his birth, is always situated in a series of webs of origin and traditions, so that 
each one of us – for ourselves and others – can always be or "come from" (a) tradition 
and (an) origin. 
The sense of affiliation with a tradition is not found only in the fact that one is pre-de-
fined (naturally, not pre-determined) by what happened in the past, i.e. in the fact that 
man, being finite, cannot be the originator of his own being, nor, in principle, as an indi-
vidual, in full power over it. On the other hand, the tradition I am affiliated with is never 
only mine – although there are circles of tradition higher and lower than national tradi-
tion. We are affiliated with it together – as members of a community. Therefore, denial of 
tradition on the diachronic plane, i.e. denial of the very affiliation with it as such, is di-
rectly connected to the denial of the whole on the synchronic plane. The link between the 
whole and tradition is found in the fact that the whole (i.e. people) always lasts much 
longer and remembers more than any of its individual parts (i.e. individuals), so that, in 
the study of history, which generally moves forward within the element of tradition, col-
lective entities of longer duration (peoples, cultures, and religions) are considered as pri-
mary objects of tradition, while people belonging to these are considered as historical 
only in a derived, though certainly necessary, form. In other words, tradition is a way in 
which a community lasts, so that the denial of one of necessity results in the denial of the 
other. Consequently: since tradition cannot be meaningfully denied, the same applies to 
the denial of the whole, i.e. to the position: I do not belong to the group/community, but 
am primarily/only an individual. 
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By this we have simultaneously made a step towards the second type of answer to al-
ready presented objection. 
The normativist reply: Man is a finite being, so he always comes to existence from a 
system which possesses much longer duration than himself, and which also has a more 
deeply grounded and farther-reaching meaning than it might seem at first glance. As such, 
man's individual life is a sequence of The Life of Man (i.e. the life of the human species), 
and the duration of this life and what man does during it is, at least in certain aspects, a 
sequence of a tradition (or, sometimes, of a number of parallel traditions). There were 
humans before me (factual proposition) just like there should be people after me (norma-
tive judgment). For my existence, I am indebted to my parents, just like they are indebted 
to their own, etc. so that, finally, it turns out that each of us is indebted for his existence – 
to the family, people, mankind. In general, a human being as a debt, is not a "corny 
phrase" at all, but a truth, which has, unfortunately, "worn out" through constant (mis)use, 
so that today the feeling of its truthfulness has been almost lost. This debt should be paid 
back – both individually, and through generations – first by the fact an individual will 
have his own offspring, and then in the activity which will not be oriented exclusively to 
himself, and the exclusive good of himself and his family, but to the actual constructions 
of his own "wholification", whether current, national and ethnic one, or virtual, "cosmo-
politan" one. 
Appendix 1: What is a nation? 
Another objection is possible here, and it could be interpreted as another variation of 
nominalism – in this case ethnic nominalism. Namely, one can question the very existence 
of what we called ethnic universals, as supra-empirical foundations of the constant exis-
tence and formation of a nation. The talk of national or "ethnic" universals must first be 
understood as an attempt to eliminate two beliefs that are ingrained in modern "philoso-
phy of nation": a) that ethnicity, i.e. nationality, is merely a construct, b) that there are 
actually no features or factors determining the specificity of peoples as such, but that they 
are, allegedly, only a result of socialization on the grounds of narratively/historically or-
ganized, and then systematically carried out and internalized constructs. On our part, we 
believe that in the greater part of most distinguishable European nations (i.e. mostly, but 
not exclusively in their case) certain factors are noticeable which have defined their ethnic 
and national features that, through history, or starting from some of its decisive points, 
members of this people share, i.e. take part in.13 Precisely this participation in a common 
project is the foundation of the typical for members of a nation and their "typical" features. 
Naturally, affiliation of individuals with a nation should not be taken as an unchange-
able given – whether in the sense of the impossibility that this individual consciously se-
lect his nation as opposed to the one against which, due to factual circumstances, the pri-
mary socialization was made (although in this case it is impossible to "shake off" the con-
sequences of the latter), or in the sense that the universal is not a permanently "en-
chained", but rather an entity that is re-shaped and changed in the course of historical 
time. However, when an ethnic (that is, "particular") universal is historically made, then 
                                                           
13 The translation of Platonic παρουσία was not accidentaly chosen here. 
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subsequent changes cannot be fully arbitrary (except if a nation succumbs to such a fun-
damental identity change that this could be interpreted as its transformation or even dis-
appearance), but the scope, impact, and nature of possible change are to a great extent 
pre-designated – which does not mean that we can discursively predict them or demonstrate 
them in advance, or that the factual flow of history allows that all its possible changes should 
become expressed. Otherwise, if the changeability of an already established ethnic universal 
were fully arbitrary in its identity, then, it would not be compulsory. That way, as a matter of 
chance, some nations could transform into others, already present, or, after accumulating 
new features beyond a critical point, one could claim that a new nation has been made from 
an already existing nation, or at least ethnicum. Naturally, both things happen, but even the 
very fact that, for instance, an ethnic-cultural group in time started to call itself by a new 
name testifies to there being a certain awareness of the substantial change of what had by 
then been its identity. Or, more strictly put: the fact that, during time, a nation can change its 
own name and self-identification14 testifies to the fact that changes within the same nation 
cannot accumulate ad infinitum with the nation still remaining within the boundaries of the 
identity that it had already constructed in its previous history. 
How do ethnic universals come into being? One must assume that their foundation can 
be located in their tribal and proto-ethnic substrates. What will emerge after this in the 
process of historical building of the nation, and which nations will emerge, this cannot be 
determined in advance, because it depends on the whim of historical accident, and not 
only on the individual "nature" of the original substrate. Therefore, in contrast to "real" 
conceptual and philosophical universals, ethnic universals carry with them a great deal of 
contingency – because they do not transcendentally precede the flow of actual history, but 
assume and develop their individuality and identity only through history. However, when 
a critical point in the formation of an ethnic identity is passed (and a key indicator of this 
is the presence or absence of nation-like self-awareness), then a particular ethnic universal 
is created which is, as a quasi-ontic ingredient, present in individual members of this 
community. Naturally, such an established generality faces the temptation time and again 
that, due to the changeable circumstances of actual history, a new, sometimes even radi-
cal, change might occur. One can even envisage a situation in which, during turbulent 
historical change, a people should preserve the continuity of name and awareness of af-
filiation, yet, in the collective What, they should still not just append their image a bit, but 
also experience true transformation – without being properly aware of it.15 
Let us stress once again: if rendering an account on the substance of an ethnic essence 
is burdensome and hardly practicable, where methodological purity or removal of para-
doxes or aporiai is hardly attainable, this, in itself, need not, indeed must not mean that 
such a thing does not really exist. In general, a tacit quasi-rule that a thing around for 
                                                           
14 For instance: (Ancient) Greeks – Romaioi – (New) Greeks or Latins – Romans – Italians. 
15 As an example one can mention the Bulgarians, whose continuity of the national historical idea is 
questionable (which might be related to the ethnical and racial change that original, Asiatic Bulgarians were 
subjected to in the Balkans), or the Croats, for whom both the continuity with the historical idea of medieval 
Croatia and ethnic continuity are questionable. Naturally, there are very successful nations (the English), or 
nations relatively resistant to the tumults of history (e.g. the Jews), who, in spite of all changes, remain firmly 
faithful to their (again historically) coined paradigm, thus testifying that the discussion of ethnic universals 
need not be a mere chimera. 
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which one cannot provide a relatively uncontroversial interpretation ("knowledge") does 
not exist, that the very existence of difficult and crucial paradoxes is an indicator that we 
have strayed – is one of the most dangerous, but unfortunately very efficient prejudices of 
the scientific spirit of Modern Age and Enlightenment. 
However, this reflection of warning cannot, naturally, help us understand what an eth-
nic universal means even in some rather formal sense. Is it a sort of idea and, if it is, is it 
so in the strict Platonic sense, i.e. as essence determining all its realizations, or in the 
sense of its reinterpretation from the modern age – a sense of an expected or desired pro-
ject / "ideal"? If the former were the case, this idea would represent the generalizing and 
individualizing summary of the totality of inevitable, formative properties of the group 
fitting to the idea. The issue here would, therefore, be what they already are. If one con-
siders the latter sense, this would entail an awareness of a mission in history that this na-
tion is given due to its "nature" (recourse to the former meaning) – which is also found in 
the self-image of some (so-called "big") nations – but, again, certainly not all of them. 
However, regardless of the fact that consciousness of own mission may be seen in some 
nations only, it is certain that an ethnic universal implies a specific mixture of the given 
which is fixed and the normative which is (self)-given.16 In other words, that which is 
(actually or allegedly) true as suppressed, and already present in the (historically shaped) 
history of a people in its orientation to eternal values – is actually only about to be ac-
complished, which means that a particular people should accommodate to its (permanent 
and "quasi-eternal") role model.17 
On the diachronic, just like on the synchronic level (provided when we discussed the 
organization of a community), the fundamental/ normative/ necessary/ intransient and the 
factual/ given/ contingent/ transient intertwine here. In both the temporal and the ontological 
sense, a nation, therefore, represents a specific mixture of necessity and arbitrariness.18 
Appendix 2: Is Being "Apolitical" a Legitimate (Political?) Position? 
If one takes a political position, this means that one is interested in common cause, i.e. 
in oneself as a part of the "body" of the political community (people/nation/civic commu-
nity). If one presents as one's political position the view that for him a "political" option is 
attractive only when it suits him personally – no matter if this results in the benefit for the 
community, or even no matter if this would directly hamper the community, then this 
would no longer be a political position, i.e. a position articulated as concern for a com-
                                                           
16 Which justifies the introduction and use of the word "idea" in this context also. 
17 Just like an ethnic universal is not a "clean" universal, the discussion of the "eternity" of a nation cannot be equal to 
eternity in general, for a number of reasons. However, that the discussion of the eternity of peoples can be justified is 
suggested in the well-known phrases of "eternal" Serbia, Russia, France, England, Germany, etc. By this an intuition is 
expressed that a nation, as a permanently self-perpetuating sequence of generations with equal/similar identity and self-
awareness is not simply liable to stringent transience – as is the case with individual persons. Therefore, although 
peoples – as peoples, made of mortal and transient individuals, are, ontically, in principle, both transient and mortal, still 
every people in general, having entered history as such, has an opportunity to resist historical forces and become 
intransient to a point; or, to use a paradoxical phrase, to reach "supra-transient sub-eternity".  
18 One should notice another analogy: just like in the discussion of the organization of the community, in 
addition to intransient principles and relations, the accidental given also comes to the scene, thus in the 
temporal domain the duration of a nation is a concept whose "mean value" is difficult to measure – between 
mere transience and pure intransience.  
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mon cause. It would rather be a position that, though seemingly "apolitical" is actually 
anti-political, and for sure morally questionable. Political pursuit is admittedly possible 
only under the assumption of self-interest, but again only if it is defined and conducted all 
along as a deliberately pre-conceived contribution to common cause. In situations in 
which self-interest is detached from interest in the community, this means not only putting 
an end to the political domain but endangering the political outright. One who is ready to 
view one's personal welfare outside of or independent from the welfare of the community 
will quickly succumb to the temptation to augment one's wellbeing not just irrespective of 
but openly against the interests of the community. (Actually, this would most likely be the 
consequence of the former decision, rather than an unexpected, surprising coincidence). 
Therefore, this, so to speak, pragmatic solipsism, is in itself anti-political, i.e. politically 
illegitimate, and thus actually inadmissible. More precisely: as an individual belief, such a 
position should not and must not be forbidden, but, as a possible grounds for the establish-
ment of a "political" position, it is reasonably untenable. In other words, any such position 
which one wishes to understand, and then carry out, under the label of the "political" is not 
only conceptually and in principle unrelated to politics, but it also inevitably clashes with it 
and virtually represents an inherent danger for the survival of the community. 
In other words, what one wishes to call political practice corresponds to the concept of 
politics only if it entails the unbreakable bond between the general and the particular – re-
gardless of the way in which we look upon the nature of this bond. On the one hand, the 
ultimate horizon (both allowed and desirable), and, so to say, the marginal condition of 
all individual projections of own good and fortune is the good of the community one be-
longs to – and the most concrete, emotionally and reflexively most tangible, "most under-
standable" community of belonging is the people. On the other hand, again, the good of 
the people/state cannot become a construction of common interest alienated from the lives 
of individuals, which the majority would blindly serve, where, not only from their view-
point – which could be wrong – but objectively, in the long term, they would fail to see 
that their efforts are justified. 
From all this one can draw a twofold conclusion. An imperative for any member of the 
political community – always, and particularly if this community is deeply endangered, is to 
help it as much as possible – doing all the things he knows best, on condition this is in the 
interest of the community. Even further: no one has the right to expect and build his own 
fortune (or perhaps the appearance of fortune – where the question of how authentic individ-
ual projections of fortune are remains secondary) at the expense of his own community. Fi-
nally, when a community (people) is facing disaster, it is inadmissible to abandon it, seeking 
further individual survival, i.e. "fortune" elsewhere (in a "happier" place) – which particu-
larly applies when the venue of personal fortune and self-actualization coincide with those 
"locations" from which the gravest danger for the survival of the community springs. 
A politically legitimate and morally tenable view of oneself in the community must, in 
principle, always entail readiness to sacrifice,19 where this implicit oath given by every 
member of every concrete historical community becomes expressed, i.e. tested, only when 
the community is actually in grave danger. In essence, never, and particularly then, may 
one be allowed to choose between oneself and the community – unless the current prac-
                                                           
19 On this, see our text: "Sacrifice: Concept, Problem, and Meaning".  
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tice and course of the community are defined by something which is deeply immoral and 
antihuman. Namely, the one who "chooses himself" has thus renounced those "parts" and 
aspects of himself without which he would not exist at all – both in the sense of physical 
existence (since I came to this world only because, through history, from one generation 
on to the other, my community has successfully struggled for its further survival), and in 
the sense of my own personal identity, which is always essentially and unbreakably medi-
ated by my affiliation with the cultural and spiritual identity of my historical community. 
If someone is ready to sacrifice for others (from his community) – if the reason for this is 
truly valuable – he does not commit a masochist act of self-negation because he believes 
his existence is worth less than the existence of the many, or people as whole. Rather, he 
subjects his individuality to the generality, embodied in the many others. However, since 
this generality, present in the others – is also present in himself, it turns out that, by sacri-
ficing himself for others, i.e. sacrificing for the common cause, the less durable part of 
ourselves is pledged in the name of the part of us which is more durable, and thus more 
valuable. So, finally: self-sacrifice means sacrificing for one's own good! 
However, if one claims that one can choose himself against the community, he inter-
rupts not only the chain of wows of all previous generations which have fought also for 
themselves by fighting for the community (here, the advancement of the individual and 
the general would match), but with such a choice he actually renounces his own self. 
More precisely, the "part" of what had been his identity by then, which would remain af-
ter such a choice, would be rid of historical routedness . It would be devoid of spiritual 
memory, social and moral connections, and would not preserve much more than bare psy-
chophysical existence. Namely, if individual spiritual identities "purged" themselves of 
everything general – which are, as a rule, things belonging to the domain of the common 
spirit – then physical survival would have to overbalance all intellectual, spiritual, and 
emotional factors – which, however, make a (concrete) human. The choice between Me 
and We is theoretically fabricated, fictitious, and truly impossible, while practically unten-
able and, ultimately, immoral. 
Readiness to sacrifice is, therefore, a pledge penetrating the essence of that which 
makes the core of the political and inspired humanity, which have been historically culti-
vated in survival with others, not beside them, and certainly not against them. Naturally, 
the position given here is certainly not fatalistic, claiming that, allegedly, individual lives 
could reach a more sublime sense and justification only through sacrifice for what is 
higher, more permanent, and more inclusive. Readiness to sacrifice is but one side of the 
interrelation between the individual and the community which entails not only (self)giving 
but, as stated and derived many times above – receiving.20 A sacrifice for community is 
welcomed not as a consequence of such a wish of the victim – for, allegedly, the individ-
                                                           
20 This argumentation may also hold in boundary situations for the political community, where some of its 
members are put in the position in which the supreme sacrifice (that of one's own existence) is one of the 
choices they are facing. Namely, if the community perishes, those ("permanent") elements of identity that it 
once carried have perished, too, so that physical survival and further (only) individual existence of people who 
have until that moment been its members can have immeasurably smaller moral and spiritual value. In the case 
of self-sacrifice, however, those who sacrifice themselves are "placing a bet", so to speak. They essentially 
claim the following: "if I sacrifice myself, perhaps, thanks to this sacrifice of mine – whether or not I survive – 
the community will live, so that, in that way, me too, although non-existing, will, in a specific way, keep on 
‘living' through those who have actually survived." 
  The Philosophico-Political Outline 29 
ual existence of the victim was not valuable enough. Rather, it may be explained through 
the fact that only the community can provide a true framework for (true) individual exis-
tence: for its sustention and affirmation. When the individual gives himself to the commu-
nity, and when this giving is correct, proper, and fruitful, then the community becomes 
better, and then all its members benefit – even those (better: particularly those) who have 
shown they are willing to sacrifice. Naturally, this readiness is not an end in itself, but, ul-
timately, represents an expression of noble egoism: if I truly wish not only to preserve, 
but also to advance and ennoble myself, I must always commit myself anew to a genuine 
generality (while always trying to recognize and apprehend it), which, ultimately, is the 
only end to provide a true and dignified (i.e. my) existence. 
Finally, we have implicitly started from the position that the present of the ethnic 
community is always a derivative and expression of all its prior generations (which, natu-
rally, includes not only continuity but also discontinuity of tradition of common cause). If 
all previous generations (who have passed away) "live", in a way, through the current 
generation, then the existence of this current generation is not only its own, but also be-
longs to all of those who "live" in it, but also to coming, at the moment non-existing gen-
erations. It follows then that no current generation has unconditional powers over itself 
and its own existence and their conditions (environmental issue!), i.e. that one generation 
cannot be fully free to choose its future (its own, but not only its own – since our future is 
also the future of those who have been, and those who will be). Rather, a human of the 
present generation is always bound by the efforts of previous generations, that is to say by 
the particular legacy and tradition. When crucial decisions on the future of a community 
are made, one should be aware of the fact that these are not only decisions for us and 
about us, but also for all those who have lived before and due to whose efforts and deci-
sions we who are now are where we are and are who we are.  
FILOSOFSKO-POLITIČKI NACRT 
Časlav Koprivica 
Namjera našega priloga je da na programski način izloži osnovne postave jedne obavezujuće 
političke paradigme. Nacrt ima dva glavna dijela od kojih prvi obuhvata načelno-filosofski dio u kojem se 
navode i obrazlaže nekoliko najnačelnijih (“metafizičkih”) stavova (1. Samo ono što je ustrojeno kao 
poredak može biti održivo; 2. Održavanje u biću cjeline bivstvujućega predstavlja samostalnu vrijednost; 
3. Cjelina poretka svega bivstvujućega se održava zahvaljujući ugledanju na neki uzor, 3a. Cjelina 
bivstvujućega posjeduje unutrašnju formu koja je održava u biću.), dok drugi izlaže praktične, dakle i 
individualno-etičke i skupno-političke implikacije prethodno izloženih stavova. Tekst je snabdjeven i trima 
dodacima u kojima, u dosluhu sa programskim dijelom priloga, nastojimo da anticipiramo i uđemo u 
dijalog sa mogućim prigovorima i nedoumicama oko nekih naših glavnih teza ili pak njihovih posljedica. 
U prilogu se, u nastojanju da se izbjegne ideološki govor, načelno i sistematski apstrahuje od podjela, 
alternativa i afilijacija koje su svojstvene tradicionalnim ideologijama. 
Ključne reči:  nacionalni program, teorija politike, opšta stvar, kriza totalitet, metafizika. 
